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ABSTRACT. A central issue in the contemporary debate in analytical metaphys-
ics is the plausibility of the ontological inclusion of ordinary objects, especially
artifacts. This paper explores the realist ontologies that include “intentional
creations” such as artifacts in their programs, giving rise to a normative view
of the world. It approaches the assumptions of two possible realist ontologies
implied in the contemporary debate on artifacts. First, it makes a distinction
between a reflexive and a non-reflexive ontology, stressing the hermeneutical
stance of the former. Second, it focuses on the reflexive nature of the ontology
being reconstructed. Third, it discusses its realist character, rejecting the objec-
tions that warn against the idealist implications of such a view. 
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I. PROPER FUNCTIONS, NORMATIVITY AND REFLEXIVITY 
A central issue in the contemporary debate on analytical metaphysics is
the plausibility of an ontology of ordinary objects, especially artifacts. As
we will focus on artifacts, it is relevant to begin with a definition. Unlike
natural entities, technical objects are classically understood as the intended
products of human action (Hilpinen 1993). That is, in order to speak
legitimately of an “artifact,” the object referred to must be intentionally
produced by an agent according to a specific description. This definition
permits leaving outside the field of artifacts those collateral products and
secondary effects that are not an intended result of a technical activity
(such as pollution or rubbish 1).
The definition also agrees with the idea of the dual nature of artifacts
(Kroes and Meijers 2002). Unlike inanimate natural objects, they have both
a physical and a functional nature. The first refers to the fact that an artifact
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is a physical object with specific properties and, as such, is governed by
natural laws. The second points to the fact that an artifact is a means to an
end in the context of human action and, for that reason, one can affirm
that its function from a social creation—meaning that an artifact is not
independent of the agent’s intentions. This way, among other intentional
aspects (Cf. Vaesen 2011), artifacts are intended to perform a function.
The examination of their predicable functions permits to show the
connection between technical objects and normativity. Some of the latent
potentialities of an artifact have a privileged status; there are many func-
tions or capacities related to its normal performance, but only one of them
can be called the proper function 2. We come here to a distinction between
system and proper functions. System functions are based on dispositions
of objects in relation to their actual systems. A chair can also function as a
ladder, helping a person to reach an object from a high place. How an
artifact acquired a new disposition is here irrelevant (Preston 1998); it is
enough to note that it actually has that disposition. By contrast, a proper
function refers to certain dispositions that the object had in the past and
that contributed to the persistence of those capacities in the present. Thus,
it involves a purpose that was initially postulated at the design stage and
reinforced during its institutionalized practice 3. In brief, for the purposes
of explaining a system function it is necessary to refer to the structural
properties that the artifact had at a certain time and to its corresponding
causal powers. Instead, to justify a proper function, it is necessary to
consider the actual object as a result of a selective history where intentional
agents (the designers) took a central role. 
This leads us to the notion of normativity. As Scheele (2006) argues, the
distinction between function and capacity becomes clear when an artifact
loses its function. If the thwarted function is a system function, then
nothing may alter the objects status, except physical change: it will keep
holding its proper function. On the contrary, if the thwarted function is
the proper one, one usually says that the artifact malfunctions, which in-
volves some kind of evaluative judgment. When a car is unable to move,
it malfunctions, since its proper function is to bring people and things from
one place to another; it has temporarily lost that capacity. The crucial differ-
ence here is that proper functions have a normative character, whereas
system functions have not. This means that the former imply normative
judgments. If one can say what an object should do, then one can determine
precisely whether or not it is performing its task properly at a given time.
In other words, in the context of artifactual ontology, the difference
between system function and proper function is a necessary condition for
a meaningful notion of malfunction. 
Finally, the normativity of proper functions becomes manifest in the very
terms used for artifactual kinds: “corkscrew,” “lighter,” “screwdriver,” “book-
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mark,” and the like. These expressions make it clear that the in-order-to is
constitutive of the object, that there is a certain task that the object should
perform, for example, to mark the page of a book. In contrast, the expres-
sions used for natural kinds lack this instrumental, clearly normative
description 4. 
The consideration of normativity from an ontological point of view
implies a richer perspective, since ontology now would include not only
what comes into a contemplative and non-reflexive sight, but also what
constitutes a virtual horizon of expectations, of norms that may be realized
or not. Not only do we perceive what lies before our eyes, but we are also
aware whether or not something fulfills the norms we project; both
processes happen in an equally direct and immediate way. There are not
two successive processes but a single one: we cannot understand a micro-
scope without certain previous expectations about its function and use plan
(Houkes 2008; Houkes y Vermaas 2010). A microscope is a normative
object; it is used for something and it fulfills its function rightly or wrongly.
Indeed, what comes into sight in front of us has less “presence” than this
virtual net of expectations. In other words, a world with intentional agents
leads necessarily to a normative world. If we link intentionality to agent
expectation, then every intentional conduct will generate expectations
that may or may not be frustrated, and this linking will generate norma-
tivity. We cannot understand the world where we live unless we assume
normativity. 
Our starting point is the factum of normativity, which constitutes the
internal grammar of the technical action. An ontological theory of artifacts
must take into account and explain this factum. This desideratum cannot
be adequately accomplished by the non-reflexive ontological perspectives,
which refuse to consider that intentional agents, and the normative phe-
nomena they originate, have any relevance in relation to the constitution
and individuation of objects in general and artifacts in particular (so long
as these views consider the existence of artifacts). Our claim is that only a
reflexive ontology can adequately explain these facts. 
What does it mean that an ontology has a reflexive nature? What
features should an artifactual ontology have, in order to consider the
intentional relationship between agents and objects? What is to say for and
against it? It is necessary first to give a preliminary account of the view we
endorse, which in fact has already become a shared program. In different
ways and from different perspectives, Baker (2007), Thomasson (2007),
Millikan (2000) and Elder (2007) have put forward a program oriented
toward viewing artifacts as part of reality. Their contribution can be seen
as an “ontological rehabilitation,” since they have abandoned the tradi-
tional Aristotelian view of artifacts as deficient objects. 
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We follow the first two authors in their philosophical goals. Their
programs layout can be summed up in the following two theses. Accord-
ing to the first, the relationship between agents (that is, their concepts,
intentions, desires, etc.) and objects becomes relevant for the constitution
of artifacts as real entities. As Baker states, “one prominent feature of the
everyday world is that it is populated by things—such as pianos, pacemakers,
and paychecks—whose existence depends on the existence of persons
with propositional attitudes.” She assumes the existence of “intention-de-
pendent objects” (2007: 11). Thomasson holds the same view in relation to
artifacts: “...the metaphysical natures of artifactual kinds are constituted by
the concepts and intentions of makers” (Thomasson, 2007: 53).
The second thesis, dependent on the first one, affirms that artifacts are
real objects. Thomasson thinks that the identification of mind-depend-
ence with Idealism assumes incorrectly that the only criteria of Realism
are the ones suitable for the natural kinds and their characteristic mind-
independence. This implies “borrowing an idea suitable for Realism about
natural objects and kinds, and assuming it must apply wholesale” (2007:
72). Far from taking this idea for granted, she argues that we must explain
what the relevant criteria for the existence of mind-dependent objects are.
In the same realist trend, Baker asserts that “...the everyday world—that
part of reality that includes us, our language, and the things that we
interact with—is no less ontologically significant than the microphysical
parts of reality” (2007: 19). Thus, Thomasson and Baker agree on demand-
ing different criteria of Realism for the artifactual kinds. 
We believe that the reflexive program of these authors is the best
explanation of the normative facts concerning artifacts. They have devel-
oped an important amount of theory, including central and collateral
discussions. Our purpose is to develop an internal critique of this view by
expanding certain implicit assumptions and stressing the reflexive aspects
of the theoretical framework. 
Our distance from these authors is twofold. Firstly, we aim at recon-
structing their position with an emphasis on reflexivity, which has not
been sufficiently developed. Reflexivity is indeed taken into account by
them. For instance, Thomasson claims, clearly following Hilpinen, that
“the methodology of many social sciences, unlike natural sciences, must
involve an empathetic understanding of the intentional states of others
and their ways of understanding and carving up the world they live in”
(2007: 63). However, we believe that reflexivity is neither considered the
basic fact nor taken in its full implications (as we shall see in the next
section). Although these authors stress their commitment to Realism, they
do not pay its reflexive nature the attention it deserves. The hermeneutic
idea that to understand artifacts is, at least in part, to understand concepts,
intentions, etc., has not been stressed and developed enough. Secondly,
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we support this “reflexive ontology” with new arguments concerning the
reflexive and realistic character of this program. 
For this purpose, we need to make a distinction between non-reflexive
and reflexive ontologies, one that will that function as a conceptual ground
where the objections and further discussions are to be placed. A prelimi-
nary account of these ontologies is necessary. A non-reflexive ontology
considers that real entities do not depend on agents having concepts,
intentions, and so on. Furthermore, an inventory or classification of real
entities should not consider the relation between persons and objects as
relevant. The result of this intentio recta is either the reduction of artifacts
to natural objects or the elimination of artifactual kinds as real ones. The
ontological model is exclusively based on the notion of natural kinds and
the criteria suitable for them. A reflexive ontology, by contrast, considers
the relation between objects and agents (intentional and conceptual) as
ontologically relevant. Therefore, cultural objects such as artifacts cannot
be understood as natural objects; the identity criteria of the latter are not
applicable to the former. This kind of ontology is reflexive because it
considers that classifying what exists in the cultural world necessarily
amounts to classifying a human view of the things involved. 
Although this paper is programmatic and as such is mainly concerned
with the outlines of an ontological project, there is a possible practical
contribution in our arguments, related both to everyday language and to
scientific praxis. Along the same lines of the reflexive model we explore,
we question the explicit or implicit requirement that everyday language
should be deprived of its illusory reflexive components; for instance, those
expressions that allude to a relation between objects and persons. Talking
about “chairwise” objects instead of chairs (van Inwagen 1990) is not and
should not be taken as an ideal (neither a realizable nor an unrealizable
one) for our everyday language and praxis. In the scientific sphere, the
latter requirement adopts the forms of “Reductionism” or “Elimination-
ism,” two theories that represent an ideal of a pure scientific language and
a pure scientific praxis deprived of such reflexive components. This way,
justifying everyday language is equivalent to criticizing the normative
ideals implied in the projectionist, reductionist, and eliminationist theories. 
II. TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE REALISM
The discussion on reflexivity should begin with a characterization of the
non-reflexive model. This model leaves no room for the intentional crea-
tions, since it deprives of reality those objects belonging to the artifact
kinds. Van Inwagen (1990) and Wiggins (2001) are representatives of this
view, among other relevant figures in this field 5. (cf. table 1.) 
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TABLE 1. ARTIFACTUAL ONTOLOGIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 6      
ARTIFACTUAL
ONTOLOGIES
Reflexive Non-reflexive
Realist
Artifacts are real objects
in a full sense: 
Baker, Thomasson
Artifacts have
 non-reflexive 
real properties: 
Elder, Millikan, Denkel
Anti-realist
Artifacts are conceptual
projections: 
Sellars
Artifacts are 
not real objects: 
Van Inwagen, Wiggins,
D. Lewis
A brief characterization of non-reflexive anti-Realism will help us de-
limit the boundaries of the non-reflexive model and will also be a starting
point for the discussion on Realism in the next section. Van Inwagen
argues that our reference to artifacts is not grounded on real entities. The
problem of collocation in relation to artifacts—that is, the alleged impos-
sibility of an artifact and another object to occupy the same spatiotemporal
location—leads him to deny ontological status to artifacts. To illustrate his
view, he imagines the building of a fort with sand in the desert, which
should make it manifest that through the mere reshaping of pre-existing
material we are not bringing any new entity into existence. In building
such an object, we have only “rearranged the furniture of earth without
adding to it” (1990: 124). Artifactual kinds share for him this logic of
rearrangement, according to which artisans merely “rearrange objects in
space and cause bonding relations to begin to hold or to cease to hold.”
For him, there are strictly speaking no artifacts (considered as real entities)
and correspondingly there are no true philosophical questions about them
(1990: 127-128). The language about artifacts should be reduced to lan-
guage about “simples” (elementary particles, living organisms, and ab-
stract objects). If we still want to refer to these entities, we should use
expressions such as “chairwise” or “housewise” (simples arranged like a
chair, a house etc.). 
Following a similar non-reflexive orientation, Wiggins (2001) examines
the possible application on the technical field of the criteria used to identify
natural kinds. Adopting an Aristotelian view, he enumerates the condi-
tions for distinguishing between natural and artifactual kinds (2001: 88-
92). One of these is having a “principle of activity,” by which he means
“law-like norms of starting to exist, existing, and ceasing to exist by
reference to which questions of the identity and persistence (...) can be
arbitrated” (Wiggins 2001: 83). Since there are no such common laws
governing the behavior of artifactual kinds, one cannot say that they are
real kinds. Furthermore, the notion that their identity is determined con-
ventionally implies that artifacts are not mind-independent, which is
another central condition for being a real kind. 
This brief sketch should make it clear that although Wiggins and van
Inwagen put forward different views, both share the traditional Aristote-
lian notion that denies artifacts ontological status as real substances, and
their view should be included in the field of “anti-Realism” (Soavi 2009).
We believe that their main deficit lies in their non-reflexive approach. This
approach can be generalized in a non-reflexive model, whose central
theoretical perspective can be described as follows: it is justified, possible
and even necessary to take distance from reality in order to build up either
distinction criteria for ontological kinds or just an inventory of the objects
in the world. 
It is justified because every object submitted to theoretical contempla-
tion consists in a set of particles—often called “simples”— such as the ones
described by the natural sciences; consequently, the task of describing the
relationship between particles and persons is at least irrelevant. At the
same time, this distance is possible, since the theoretician is able to avoid
the consideration of his own situation in the task of making the most
suitable description of his objects (although he may actually concede that
this distance has in fact no existence, for every individual and every culture
projects a concept of reality on the objects around). Finally, this distance
is necessary because the theoretician making the description or the inven-
tory should not taint them with his subjective traits. The intentional stance
toward objects has no “ontological effect” at all, according to this model;
thus, the distance taken turns, in a natural way, into the philosophical
views of Reductionism or Eliminativism. As we have seen, in its most
extreme versions this non-reflexive ontology claims that actually there are
no genuine philosophical problems about artifacts, since artifacts do not
belong in our ontology (van Inwagen 1990). 
In opposition to the non-reflexive ontologies, we think it possible to
conceive another kind of realist ontology, which would admit at least
some intentional creations as part of its network. The reflexive ontology
that we put forward starts with the fact—pointed out by Davidson among
others—that we are not able to distance ourselves from our own concep-
tual scheme in order to describe reality as it is; that is, it considers from the
onset the ontological relevance of the relationship between objects and
persons, or, more specifically, between entities and the agents that pro-
duce, construe or understand them 7.
We mention Davidson’s thesis (in a simplified version) only to relate it
to the realm of artifacts. We do not pretend to approach the complex issue
whether natural kinds can be properly dealt with a non-reflexive ontol-
ogy; rather, our aim is to deal with issues concerning artifactual kinds.
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However, for the authors included in the model of a reflexive ontology,
there is a wide agreement on the idea that the natural world is dealt with
properly within the natural sciences in a non-reflexive way; they believe
that the natural sciences are able to depict the reality of natural kinds such
as it is. It is not clear if this point of view comes either from a philosophical
conviction or from a concession to naïve Realism, Scientism, or the meta-
physics implied in the theories of direct reference. This concession would
have the purpose not only of simplifying the discussion, but of making
more plausible the idea that, in a different or more restricted field—that
of technical inventions—things could be different 8.
Anyway, the reflexive relationship that we have mentioned has clear
ontological implications in the case of artifacts. The answer to the question
“what is a knife?” asked in an everyday context will necessarily include
the notion that it is “an object used for...” Any answer not including the
specification of the intended function (for example, an answer that merely
describes the form or the structure of knives, or their cultural meaning)
will be insufficient to the average speaker. The clause “it is used for” leads
to intentional agents and intentions in general, no matter which way the
latter are interpreted—whether individually or socially, linguistically ar-
ticulated or not. In short, if someone does not understand the relevant
intentional context, then he will not be able to answer properly an onto-
logical question as the one just asked. The need to understand relevant
aspects of the human dimension as a requisite to identify real entities
reveals a hermeneutic feature of everyday ontology.
It is also possible to think other examples. A handbrake (of a car) is an
intention-dependent object, an object comprising a set of properties de-
termined by the design of intentional agents. This object is also ontologically
determined by its different uses, by the different functional attributions
that it supports, and by the multiple social meanings it refers to. In a
post-apocalyptic world with no intentional beings, or in a culture radically
different from ours, a handbrake would lose these intentional properties
up to the point that it would be a mistake to use the same name for it as
before; it would not be the same object.
Our consideration on the intentional objects as respectable entities
(from an ontological point of view) suggests that we are dealing not only
with the insertion of new entities into the ontology, but also with the
inclusion of a new relationship, one between entities and persons (in their
various roles as agents, producers, interpreters, and so on). This new
relationship supplies the framework for the “insertion” of new entities,
and it is the main reason why we call it a “reflexive” ontology.  
Its reflexive nature has two levels, both sharing the assumption that in
order to identify ordinary objects—and, more specifically, artifacts—one
must be able to understand the human world. A closer examination of the
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theoretical stance here involved shows that this assumption can take
either an adequate or an inadequate form (represented by the first and the
second reflexive levels, respectively).
In the first level, the theoretician introduces reflexivity in the sphere of
action that he analyzes, distancing himself from his object of study. He
depicts what takes place in the human sphere of action, yet limits himself
to a depiction of certain conditions for understanding artifacts taken as a
“human need”: the need to admit normative properties as if they were
part of the reality involved in the dealings with the world. As the theore-
tician remains outside the reflexive stance, this level is not complete. The
stance is concerned only with the relationship between agents and objects
inside the depicted human sphere. The fundamental assumption here
comes from the traditional sense of “theory” as a distanced, as it were
“from nowhere,” contemplation of the objects under study. The result of
such a stance is twofold: (1) this level may be criticized from the perspec-
tive of a realist position in the traditional sense, and (2) the position of the
theoretician can be shown to be contradictory (which helps answering the
critique of point (1). 
A brief explanation of these points must be given. (1) A realist, non-re-
flexive, objection may argue that the ontologist is not forced to share the
view of the agents involved in the depicted field of action. What the agents
in this field consider as real artifactual kinds can be judged by the theore-
tician as mere conceptual “projections” of those who are taking part in the
sphere. He might assume that the intentional relation is relevant for them
to understand artifacts, but he might at the same time deny that this
relation is ontologically relevant in an absolute sense, since it is not
relevant at least for himself. 
(2) Is it possible to assume this stance? We do not believe so. In order to
understand the relation between agents and artifacts, his primary object
of study, the theoretician must be able to identify both poles of the
relationship, which includes the identification of artifacts. In order to
perform this latter task, he also must be able to understand the intentions
and concepts that are relevant to define the corresponding artifactual
kinds. This means that he must be able to understand the relevant con-
cepts and intentions, as it were, from the inside: to share the same view of
the agents depicted, as if he were one of these agents himself. Without that
same view, he would not be able to tell artifacts from natural objects. These
requirements amount to a full-fledged reflexive stance or, to put it in our
terms, to a second reflexive level. An absolute distance between theory
and its object is here impossible. This level includes not only the relation
between agents and artifacts, but also the relation between the theoreti-
cian that aims at understanding this relation and the concepts involved. 
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Further, some central objective properties of artifacts are apprehended
only through praxis by means of conceptions of the form “this object could
be used for.” This stance requires that the agent imagine for what purpose
the object could be used and in what ways he can have an active interac-
tion with it, that is, the ways he could manipulate it concretely. To
understand an artifact such as a hammer, one must be able to represent
the set of relationships in which one could be actively involved. This does
not imply that the theoretician has an epistemic privilege over users or
makers of artifacts; his aim is to reconstruct knowledge about objects that
accompanies everyday praxis. A reflexive ontology does not pretend to
impose a view on the everyday notion of artifacts; it only attempts to show
how certain objects are understood, and which theoretical directions are
not adequate. 
Many are the advantages of our reflexive stance. First, from this view-
point it makes sense to conceive intention-dependent objects, something
that is not possible in the non-reflexive models, within whose framework
only natural kinds can be thought of. Second, it permits the understanding
of normative facts and normative concepts in general, whereas a non-re-
flexive view makes this understanding difficult. Third, this ontology has
a practical nature. The Aristotelian project of contemplating the objects of
the world from a distance is inadequate, because contemplation is also a
way of acting or engaging in the world, and since we are surrounded by
objects that are what they are just because we do what we do with them,
then the very existence of these objects depends on our faculties to create
and act.
This implies recognizing the relevance of the practical human dimen-
sion, something that Heidegger conceives as the dimension of the Dasein’s
care (die Sorge), that is, the domain of a primary and non-derivative
relationship with the things that are “ready at hand” (das Zuhandensein)
(Heidegger 2006: § 15-16). For him, the “in order to” (Wozu) in a meaningful
context is precisely, and in the first place, that which gives sense and
ontological concreteness to the entities in the world. The role of the
practical agent—the Dasein—in an intentional description has thus a
central place, since it does not refer to an isolated subject that contemplates
the world but to a subject involved in some praxis and primarily related
to a set of technical objects or tools at hand. 
The philosophy of Sein und Zeit articulates the hermeneutical and
reflexive nature of the view we are supporting with great insight and from
the onset, since it makes manifest that the relation between agents and
artifacts has ontological relevance. The notion of Dasein makes it clear,
even more than the reflexive views of Baker or Thomasson, that the individ-
ual is part of a net of practical relations. There is no isolated individual,
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with no practical interests, lying outside this practical net where artifacts
play a central role—as the modern worldview pretended.
Mirroring this Heideggerian insight, Baker claims that we know “about
ordinary things firsthand: we encounter them, we manufacture them, and
we interact with them. Our knowledge of collections of simple or funda-
mental particles is much more meager, and much more distant, than is our
knowledge of ordinary things” (Baker 2007: 9). In other words, in everyday
life the Dasein is engaged in activities that take place in a world understood
as a horizon of intelligibility and object individuation. Here the double
meaning of the reference (Verweisung) in the field of tools—to use the
Heideggerian terminology—becomes clear: one sense refers to the
means/end relationship, whereas the other refers to the tool/tool relation-
ship in the background of an “equipmental whole” (Zeugganzheit)
(Tugendhat 2001). In this latter sense, the pen refers to the paper and the
paper to the desk; this set of things makes up a whole, which as a system
pre-exists any use of its constituents. This way, each artifact is related to
others, each one is included in a context of intentional objects—one could
say that each one of them presupposes its context in a practical way.
Consequently, the Heideggerian notion of Zeugganzheit helps to charac-
terize a richer conception of reality, a conception that—as we have pointed
out—presupposes human praxis.
In the same spirit, the introduction of the ordinary viewpoint in the
elaboration of a concept of reality that includes artifacts has a similar
purpose. It seeks to overcome the schizoid picture of the individual
emerging from non-reflexive ontologies, that is, a picture of the individual
as having an authentic relationship with natural objects (whose nature is
independent of intention) rather than a merely illusory interaction with
the intentional and cultural creations. 
III. TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE REALISM
In the preceding section, we have discussed the reflexive nature of an
ontology in which artifacts and the ordinary world of objects can be
properly described. In this section we shall defend the thesis that this
framework is a realist one, in a sense that will be delineated in the course
of the discussion (the main positions to be discussed are represented in
table 1). 
Our opening claim now is that, in order to build up an ontology of
everyday objects, one needs something broader than a restricted defini-
tion of reality such as “real is everything that does not depend on the
human opinions, conceptions and/or intentions.” The latter notion, which
is unquestionably assumed by the non-reflexive ontologies, is a conse-
quence of the principle that our language and our thought can only have
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an informative/descriptive role with respect to reality, never a constitutive
one 9. As we have seen, Wiggins and van Inwagen represent two paradig-
matic ways of understanding “real” in these terms. A closer look at their
non-reflexive ontologies yields, however, an important difference be-
tween Reductionism and Eliminativism (Soavi 2009). Reductivists, like
Devitt and Wiggins, accept that objects such as hammers and chairs are
real physical objects. “Being a hammer” or “being a chair” are properties
equivalent to “having been born in 2007,” that is, they are real properties
that are accidental with respect to the nature of the objects having these
properties. Eliminativists such as van Inwagen and Merricks, by contrast,
radicalize the non-reflexive stance by way of rejecting the very existence
of those material objects identified as chairs and hammers. The only things
they include in the ontology are particles, particles properties and the
relations among them. 
In addition to its distorted and bizarre picture of everyday experience,
Eliminativism is not able to justify our everyday practices, which involve
ordinary objects. As Baker states, whereas we have synchronic and dia-
chronic criteria of identity for the most part of everyday objects, we do not
have comparable serviceable criteria to identity the collections of particles
supposed to coincide with these manifest objects (Baker 2007: 6). More
generally, both Eliminativism and Reductionism avoid any reference to
intentionality as constitutive of certain objects, and they are both incapable
of explaining the normative fact that pervades the human Lebenswelt, an
explanation which we consider a desideratum of any adequate and com-
plete ontology. They leave the agent-object relation unexplained, offering
a non-reflexive ontological account suitable for the natural kinds, yet inca-
pable of giving a plausible account for the existence of the created and
artificial kinds.  
A common assumption of non-reflexive ontologies such as these is that
they seem to understand “mind-dependent” as “subjective,” considering
“subjective” as that which is optional and would depend, in the end, on
human will. However, as Baker states, this characterization is not accept-
able since it does not grasp the reality of created kinds (Baker 2007). Even
though it is true that building a highway is optional and depends on the
human will, it is also true that: (a) This task requires an amount of materials
whose properties and dispositions are in fact independent of the users
mind (this way, a mere piece of wood is incapable of generating electricity
or capturing radio waves, facts which cannot be changed by anybody at
will); (b) The very design restricts the options available to the designer (for
example, the computer designer must exclude inconsistent designs such
as the ones violating certain logical or mathematical rules that govern his
task), and (c) Once the artifact is built up, it acquires a reality that is not
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modifiable at will (one cannot change at will the essential properties of the
object commonly identified as a table or a handbrake).  
This shows that the intentional constitution of entities such as artifacts
does not imply at all that the constituted things have a merely “subjective”
nature. It is necessary to understand “real” not simply as that sphere which
is there, in front of us, or from which we can distance ourselves in order
to understand it properly (Baker 2007:47). The admission into the ontology
of intention-dependent entities such as artifacts implies thinking on new
objects, specially the countless ones of everyday life, which contribute to
our practical and ordinary sense of reality. As Thomasson puts it, 
just as we do not need to maintain that all entities are belief-independent to
maintain a general thesis of Realism, so we need not conceive of institutional and
artifactual kinds as existing and having their natures entirely independently
of all beliefs in order to treat them ontologically seriously, as more than mere
phantasms or mental constructions (in the way that all kinds are, according to
the idealist or constructivist) (Thomasson 2003: 605). 
Following another argumentative strategy, which amounts to an indirect
defense of a reflexive ontology in our sense, we will now present the
absurd or undesired results (for common sense as well as for scientific
praxis) of a non-reflexive ontology. An ontology of this kind—and its
notion of “real”—implies among others the following assumptions: 
— An ontological impoverishment, since this ontology leaves aside an
intolerable amount of entities that are spontaneously considered as real,
not only by our everyday praxis but also by scientific praxis (both in its
more spontaneous contexts and in the more institutionalized or regulated
ones).
— An impoverishment of our understanding of the human praxis, since
in the context of such an ontology it is not possible to think of everyday
and scientific praxis as mediated through language (understood as an
inter-subjective praxis) and through the admission of intentional entities.
In other words, without the admission of intention-dependent entities, a
great part of human action would lose its meaning. We would even lose
the identification criteria of a variety of human actions: how could one
describe correctly the action of hammering without assuming that ham-
mers (that is, objects identified by means of certain functions) are real
objects?
—An impoverishment of the scientific language, which becomes at least
a hindrance to scientific praxis, since a strict application of such a model
would result in science losing the language that facilitates the access to
theory. Natural sciences require, among other practical conditions, the use
of instruments, that is, a set of technical means (for instance, in a labora-
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tory, microscopes, Petrie dishes, autoclaves, and so forth). Besides the
practical hindrance mentioned above, it is a debatable question—which
we leave open—whether the ontological commitments implied in the very
use of these instruments can or cannot be rejected once they have served
their functions. In the case of human sciences, the very object of analysis—
human conduct, history, and so on—is permeated by intentionality.
Finally, a central epistemological notion that strengthens the Realism
of reflexive ontology is the idea of learning in the sense of Millikan, who
links it to the notion of substance. Our ontological model approaches
artifacts as “substances,” that is, it considers them as kinds from which one
can gather information at different times as a result of a real connection,
since there is an ontological ground (Millikan 2000). The possession of a
substance concept (“corkscrew,” for example) makes it possible to add
knowledge in each new encounter with the same substance. From Milli-
kan’s perspective, artifacts would be “real” kinds, since learning from them
has a real ground. The inductive potential associated with a kind is thus
no mere accident.
The basic fact that we are stressing here is that it is possible to learn from
artifacts, and that this learning is about objective properties. Although the
designer (in a wide sense that we need not define at this point) cannot
learn from what he creates, the users can always add new data in each
encounter with the same artifact or with other tokens of the same kind of
artifact (Thomasson 2007). There are a variety of artifactual properties from
which one can obtain knowledge: physical and chemical properties, other
properties related to the artifacts meaning (if one considers artifacts as
social signs, one can learn about their symbolic social status or their role
in certain rituals), and the functional properties (proper or accidental) that
can be actually realized. Some of these properties are independent from
the users that learn about them. This strengthens our thesis that these
entities are the way they are, and have the properties they have, inde-
pendently of their being known or not.
At this point, it must be stressed that the learning of artifactual kinds is
not constrained to the same conditions as those of learning of natural
kinds. Our knowledge of the latter (for example, of the kind “gold”) might
be completely mistaken, but this would have no effect on the independent
nature of that kind. On the contrary, in the artifactual field, where the
intentional creations have an “author,” one must admit that some agents—
the designers, or eventually the users that assume the role of re-designers
(cf. Houkes 2008)—have an “epistemic privilege.” In other terms, there is
at least an essential asymmetry between any user of an artifact and its
creator or intentional designer, in the sense that the latter is preserved
from being entirely mistaken about what he has created, even if one
acknowledges that the design—or the artifact concept—is the result of a
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complex creative process (Vega and Lawler, forthcoming). As a conse-
quence, the agents involved in the original design of a successfully created
artifact know what they have created; one could not say the same in the
case of a brand new user or somebody that simply meets an artifact
without knowing its proper function 10.
It is important to differentiate our position from those views that can
be labeled as “reflexive anti-Realism,” which deny reality to technical
objects but consider the relation between agents and objects as relevant.
Sellars (1963), for instance, believes that artifacts are “manifest images,”
that is, they are nothing but projections made by people on different
materials, which in themselves include no artifacts. As a result, this kind
of anti-realist Projectivism stands in opposition to Eliminativism/Reduc-
tionism. 
However, the notion of “projection” forwards a wrong way to under-
stand artifacts, for they are neither merely physical objects nor merely
human projections. It is true that our intentional stance contributes, from
an ontological perspective, to the existence of intention-dependent ob-
jects: screwdrivers, flags, and churches are just the kind of objects that
could not exist without the existence of beings with intentional attitudes.
Concerning these artifactual kinds, Thomasson affirms, “the concepts of
those who create and sustain the kinds (not of speakers) are constitutive of
the natures of the kinds available for reference” (2007: 65). Even so, this
avowed conscience-dependence does not mean that they are mere pro-
jections or that “magic ways” of creation are summoned. Artifacts are
different from mere projections, as they transcend every given act of
consciousness; also, because they are solidly established objects, spatio-tem-
porally founded on physical objects that are external to them—the flag on a
piece of cloth, the church on a set of bricks and cement (Thomasson 2005: 135).
The defense of a reflexive ontology that admits intentional entities
should not be considered an “idealizing leap” that would associate the
mere possession of a concept with the emergence of an authentic entity.
Mere thinking does not bring new entities into existence. Likewise, it is
impossible that the physical spatio-temporal properties of an object be
altered by an act of thinking. The creation of new objects in the field of
artifacts occurs only under certain restricted conditions: conventions,
social rules, and preexistent materials (Baker 2007: 44-46). It is our practices
and conventions—a social crystallization of our intentions—that make a
piece of wood a table, and another piece of wood with the same physical
and chemical properties a work of art, or simply firewood. A designer is
not a demiurge capable of creating ex nihilo: he operates within a specific
field of possibilities, materially as well as culturally determined; he acts
within a particular tradition, in a context of local interests that partially
shape the symbolic and physical structure of his artifactual creations. 
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This argument shows that a radical intentionalist position about artifact
creation is untenable: concepts are nothing if they are not materially
realized. First, one needs a physical and functional structure; then, one
must be able to explain how this structure partially depends on concepts
and intentions. This is not possible when the technical ideas have not been
successfully realized in some concrete artifact (Vega 2007). Consequently,
mere technical ideas—such as Da Vinci’s inventions or the hundreds of
extraordinary machines that populated the “invention books” at the be-
ginning of the Modern Age—cannot be considered authentic artifacts
(Basalla 1988). A necessary condition to claim legitimately that some
artifact exists is the very existence of at least one concrete token of that
artifactual kind that has, at least once, properly fulfilled its function.
Concrete instantiation and effectiveness are then necessary conditions to
legitimately speak of an artifactual kind, even when the kind in question
consists in only one exemplar. Artifactual kinds are, precisely, usually
expressed by success terms: the identification procedure of an artifact
implies that at least one referent has been successfully used, at least once,
for its intended function. As Franssen states, “we can hardly conceive of
the existence of an artifact kind K if there are no objects having the physical
properties that allow them to be used for K-ing” (2009: 939). 
Our view diverges here from the one put forward by Thomasson;
unlike her, we deem it necessary to stress the material constrictions in the
process of technical creation. Not every conceptual creation is realized in
a new artifactual kind, and the limits of conceptual imagination and
creation are bound by tradition and natural laws governing matter. Al-
though Thomasson rightly concedes ontological status to artifacts, she
avoids alluding directly to such restrictions, which turns out into a some-
what abstract model of technical authorship. As Simondon (2006: 60 ff.)
has emphasized, only from the distant and illusory standpoint of a demi-
urgic author, can one think that matter is absolutely malleable, that can be
completely subjected to an arbitrary will. An intentionalist theory of
technical creation must take these facts into account. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Through the discussion of some central ideas in the contemporary debate
on the ontology of artifacts, this paper aims at outlining the most impor-
tant aspects of a reflexive and realist view as a better position from which
to explain certain products of human intentional practice: artifacts. Our
reconstruction and internal critique of the conceptual context put forward
by authors such as Baker and Thomasson has shown certain limits and
difficulties for the non-reflexive ontologies and, at the same time, the
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advantages of a reflexive ontology that permits the inclusion of intention-
dependent objects.
Among other points, we have developed this ontological project in the
following two directions: the specification of two levels of reflection and
the focus on the limitations that the material imposes on the technical
creation. Far from intending to reject the project of Baker and Thomasson
altogether, these arguments seek to expand their view, especially by
stressing its reflexive character. We believe that normativity, which is
constitutive of artifacts functions, can be adequately explained only from
a reflexive standpoint, whose Realism need not—and should not—be
submitted to the traditional standards of the natural kinds. 
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NOTES
1 Some may think that Hilpinen’s definition of artifacts (followed by Thomas-
son) cannot be applied to bioartifacts such as cereals or domestic animals, that
is, to organisms with delimited functions that are the product of an artificial
selection process. However, this is only the case if one takes into account the
particular conditions added by Hilpinen (in 1992; 1993) since they allude, to
put it briefly, to a recognition moment and a detection of certain intended
features in the structure of the created object. The general definition of artifact
—an object that has been intentionally made or produced for a certain
purpose—does not per se give rise to such an objection. 
2 Although there are a variety of positions regarding the question of artifactual
functions—such as intentionalist and reproductivist perspectives—we as-
sume that the pluralistic approach put forward by Preston, which is not our
aim to discuss in detail, can properly illuminate ontological and epistemologi-
cal issues. 
3 Certain works from contemporary art reinforce the ontological relevance of
the notion of a technical proper function. In the famous ready-made “Foun-
tain” (Duchamp, 1917), it becomes evident that when the urinal was placed
in a museum, it was intentionally stripped of its usual function as determined
by its design. By changing the context where the urinal was placed, Duchamp
showed the relative character and the institutional genesis of the division
between a work of art and a functional object. It is clear that without having
certain pre-understanding concerning the “proper” uses of a urinal, this kind
of esthetic experiment would have not succeeded or at least it would not have
gained so much attention. 
4 Naturally, this is not the case when natural scientists name different parts or
organs of animals and plants; in this field it is possible to project proper
functions and to distinguish them from the accidental ones. 
5 Other non-reflexive positions are those of D. Lewis (1991) and Merricks (2001:
40-42), which are not described here for reasons of space.
6 The sketched classification do not pretend to be exhaustive.
7 A subcategory of non-reflexive ontology that does include artifacts within the
realm of reality is presented by Elder (2007). However, his approach puts
forward an identification procedure of distinctive notes, which is inspired in
the typical procedure for identifying natural kinds and pays no attention
to the intentional dependence of these objects. Similarly, Denkel (1995)
justifies the reality of artifacts with a realist model typical of the natural kinds
(see Table 1). 
8 In different terms, Soavi (2009) makes it manifest that a certain amount of
reflexivity belongs also to the natural kinds. She criticizes Wiggins thesis that
the identity conditions of the natural kinds can be established by means of
non-conventional ways exclusively. Questions like when a lake or a volcano
ceases to exist, for example, cannot only be settled by scientific empirical
research but also need conventional decisions. Since conventional decisions
can be found both in natural and created kinds, their presence is of no help
to define artifactual kind as opposed to the natural ones.     
9 In an epistemological dimension that goes beyond this paper, this view was
articulated by Lakoff as “Objectivism,” that is, the position holding that no
true fact can depend on people’s beliefs, knowledge and concepts (of this fact)
(Lakoff 1987: 164). As an example of this standpoint, Ernest Sosa maintains
that the metaphysical realist is engaged with the idea that there exists “an
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in-itself reality independent of our minds and even of our existence, and that
we can talk about such reality and its constituents by virtue of correspon-
dence relations between our language (and/or our minds), on the one hand,
and things-in-themselves and their intrinsic properties (including their rela-
tions), on the other” (Sosa 1993: 609). Theodore Sider, another supporter of
this standpoint, holds that what exists cannot depend on human activity at
all (Sider 2002: 156-157; see also Zimmerman 2002). 
10 Simondon (1969) approaches this constitutive asymmetry between the
author/designer and the user showing the distance between “adult knowl-
edge” (of the designer) and “child knowledge” (restricted to the mere recog-
nition of the artifact’s output).
REFERENCES
Baker, L.R. (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life. An Essay in Practical Realism,
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Basalla, G. (1988), The Evolution of Technology, New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Dancy, J. (2005), “Non-naturalism,” in D.Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical
Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 122-145.
Dancy, J. (2006), “The thing to use,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
(37): 58-61.
Denkel, A. (1995), “Artifacts and constituents,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research LV/2: 311-322.
Elder, C. (2007), “On the place of artifacts on ontology,” in E. Margolis and S.
Laurence, eds., Creations of the Mind. Theories of Artifacts and their Repre-
sentation, New York: Oxford University Press.
Franssen, M. (2006), “The normativity of artifacts,” Studies in History and Philoso-
phyof Science (37): 42–57. 
Franssen, M. (2009), “Artifacts and normativity,” in A. Meijers, ed., Philosophy of
Technology and Engineering Sciences, London: Elsevier.
Heidegger, M. (2006), Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: M. Niemeyer. 
Hilpinen, R. (1992), “On artifacts and works of art,” Theoria 58 (1): 58-82.
Hilpinen, R. (1993), “Authors and artifacts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
93: 155-178.
Houkes, W. (2008), “Designing is the construction of use plans,” in P. Vermaas,
P. Kroes, A. Light and S. Moore, eds., Philosophy and Design. From Engineering
to Architecture, New York: Springer.
CRELIER; PARENTE / TECHNICAL OBJECTS / 217
Houkes, W. y Vermaas, P. (2010), Technical Functions. On the Use and Design of
Artifacts, Nueva York: Springer.
Hughes, J. (2009), “An artifact is to use: an introduction to instrumental func-
tions,” Synthese, (168) 1.
Kroes, P. and Meijers, A. (2002), “The dual nature of technical artifacts: presen-
tation of a new research programme,” Techné (6), 2: 4-8.   
Lakoff, G. (1987), Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lewis, D. (1991), Parts of Classes, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Merricks, T. (2001), Objects and Persons, New York: Oxford University Press.
Millikan, R. (2000), On Clear and Confused Ideas, New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Preston, B. (1998), “Why is a wing like a spoon? A pluralist theory of function,”
The Journal of Philosophy (95): 215-254.
Scheele, M. (2006), “Function and use of technical artefacts: social conditions of
function ascription,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (37): 23-36.
Scheele, M. (2007), “Social norms in artefact use: proper functions and action
theory,” Techné (10) 1: 60-70.
Sellars, W. (1963), Science, Perception and Reality, London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Sider, Th. (2002), Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Lon-
don: Oxford University Press.
Simondon, G. (1969), Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, Paris: Aubier-Mon-
taigne. 
Simondon, G. (2006), L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’informa-
tion, Paris: Jerome Millon. 
Soavi, Marzia (2009), “Antirealism and artefact kinds,” Techné. Research in Philoso-
phy and Technology (13) 2. 
Sosa, E. (1993), “Putnam’s pragmatic Realism,” Journal of Philosophy 90: 605–626.
Thomasson, A. (2007), “Artifacts and human concepts,” in E. Margolis and
S.Laurence, eds., Creations of the Mind. Theories of Artifacts and their Repre-
sentation, New York: Oxford University Press.
Thomasson, A. (2005), “Ingarden and the ontology of cultural objects,” in A.
Chrudzinski, ed., Existence, Culture and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingar-
den, Frankfurt: Ontos: 115-136.
Thomasson, A. (2003), “Realism and human kinds,” Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research LXVII (3): 580-609.
Tugendhat, E. (2001), Aufsätze 1992-2000, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Van Inwagen, P. (1990), Material Beings, New York: Cornell University Press.
Vega, J. (2007), “La sustancialidad de los artefactos,”, in D. Parente, ed. Encruci-
jadas de la técnica, La Plata (Argentina): EDULP.
Vega, J. and Lawler, D. (forthcoming), “Creating artifactual kinds,” in M.
Franssen, P. Kroes and P. Vermaas, eds., The Metaphysics of Technical Artefacts,
Dordrecht: Synthese Library.
Wiggins, D. (2001), Sameness and Substance Renewed, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Zimmerman, D. (2002), “The constitution of persons by bodies: a critique of
Lynne R. Baker’s Theory of Material Constitution,” Philosophical Topics (30):
295-338.
218 / LUDUS VITALIS / vol. XXI / num. 39 / 2013
